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Terror organizations are not monolithic nor is their structure stable. Rather, they are made up of heterogeneous factions that frequently splinter from one another as the political and economic landscape shifts. Consider a few examples.
Republican militants in Northern Ireland have experienced a variety of splinterings. In the late 1960s, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) split from the Original IRA due to disagreements over military policy. In the mid-1980s, the extremist Continuity IRA splintered from the Provisionals when the Provisionals abandoned their policy of refusing to participate in parliament.
Another radical splinter group, the Real IRA, broke from the Provisionals in the 1990s because of the Provisionals' decision to embrace the peace process that led to the Good Friday Agreement.
Militant Palestinian nationalism has been represented by a variety of terrorist groups. These include factions of the Palestine Liberation Organization, such as the al Aqsa Martyrs, the Demo- Such internal divisions within terrorist organizations have important affects on both patterns of terrorist violence and counterterrorism strategies. 1 For instance, factions often disagree over the relative value of negotiated settlement versus continued violence. As a result, when one faction accepts government concessions violence can increase, both because the remaining faction is more extreme than the faction that accepted concessions and because the extremists use violence to "spoil" peace negotiations (Bueno de Mesquita 2005a; Kydd and Walter 2002; Stedman 1997) .
Such dynamics can be observed, among other places, in both Israel and Northern Ireland. Radical Palestinian factions increased the level of violence significantly following the Oslo accords between the Israelis and Palestine Liberation Organization. Palestinian terrorism caused more fatalities in the four years after Oslo than in the fifteen years prior to it. Similarly, following the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland, the radical splinter Real IRA carried out the Bombing of Omagh, the single most deadly attack in the history of the Troubles.
Factionalization also affects internal relations within terror organizations. Factions are often locked in competition with one another for adherents and public support. Such competition can itself cause violence. For instance, in both Sri Lanka and the Palestinian territories, polls indi-bility of a splinter emerging. However, factors that increase the risk of a splinter do not necessarily create incentives for the original faction to become more extreme. Further, as already mentioned, a strong economy decreases the probability of there being a splinter and decreases total terrorist mobilization, but increases the ideological extremism of both the original group and the splinter group, should one form. Finally, the better able the splinter faction is to provide non-ideological benefits to its members, the more likely a splinter is to form. However, the effect of capacity for providing non-ideological benefits on either faction's ideological position is ambiguous.
The analysis also has implications for conflict and stability within terrorist organizations. The spatial logic suggests that there are two possible sources of inter-factional conflict: ideological divergence and competition over contested adherents. Moreover, factors that tend to mitigate one of these sources of internecine fighting will exacerbate the other. Finally, the model shows that the distribution of ideological preferences of the memberships of the factions will be skewed away from the ideological positions of the factions themselves.
The Model
In this section I lay out the players, timeline, and payoffs of the game I will study. In the next section I provide a substantive discussion of the assumptions.
Players
Consider a model with three sorts of players: the leader of the original terrorist faction (t), a potential splinter terrorist faction leader (s), and a continuum of potential terrorists. I adopt the convention of referring to the leader of the original terrorist faction as "she" and the leader of the potential splinter faction as "he."
Timeline
The game is played as follows. At the beginning of the game the original terrorist faction's leader chooses an ideological position x t ∈ [x t , ∞) ⊂ R. After the original group chooses its position, Nature determines the potential splinter leader's capacity for providing non-ideological benefits to members of his faction (denoted β s ). The potential splinter leader then decides whether or not to splinter. If the splinter leader does splinter, he also chooses an ideological position x s ∈ [x t + , ∞), where > 0 can be arbitrarily small. Finally, each member of the population makes an affiliation decision. A member of the population can become a terrorist by joining the original terror faction or the splinter faction (should it exist). She can also opt not to join one of the terrorist factions.
In this case, she has two choices. She can participate in the economy or she can choose to be a radical activist without joining a terrorist group (referred to as "the radical outside option").
Payoffs
Each member of the population, i, has an ideal point in the ideological space given by x i ∈ R. The ideologies of the members of the public are distributed according to a continuously differentiable distribution F , with density f , whose support is the real line. I assume that f is single peaked with mean 0. Throughout I adopt the interpretation that ideologies further to the right are more extreme and ideologies further to the left are more moderate.
If a member of the population of potential terrorists, i, joins terrorist faction j her payoff is:
where β j is a group-specific, non-ideological payoff and I assume that u(·) is increasing, convex, minimized at 0, and that u ≤ 0. All of these assumptions are satisfied by, for example, quadratic preferences (i.e., −u(|x j − x i |) = −(x j − x i ) 2 ).
A member of the population of potential terrorists also has two outside options. Should she choose to remain in the normal economy, she receives a payoff of γ, where γ represents the underlying state of the economy. She can also choose to be a radical activist without joining a terrorist group, in which case she receives a payoff of ρ(x i ), where ρ(·) is increasing in x i . I restrict the potential terrorists' payoffs in several ways. First, I assume that ρ(x i ) > γ, for all x i > x t . This insures that there does not emerge a situation in which a member of society is so extreme that he chooses to remain in the normal economy, forgoing violence entirely, simply because neither of the factions are radical enough for his tastes.
Next, I assume that γ > ρ(0), which says that the mean member of society prefers to participate in the economy than to engage in the radical outside option. I also require that x t −u −1
+ is the positive element (|a|). This says that the most moderate person who would actually become a terrorist has an ideology to the right of the societal mean (zero). Taken together, these two assumptions guarantee that the people who are willing to consider becoming terrorists have ideologies to the right of the mean ideology in society.
Lastly, I assume that ρ(·) and u(·) satisfy a single-crossing property. In particular, if ρ(
This assumption simply states that, as a population member's ideology becomes more moderate than a terrorist faction's ideology, the payoff of joining that terrorist faction diminishes at a rate that is faster than the rate at which that population member's payoff from the radical outside option diminishes.
Both the original terrorist faction's leader and the splinter leader (conditional on splintering) seek to maximize his or her faction's support. Thus, their payoffs are increasing in the proportion of the population of potential supporters their faction attracts. Let N j be the proportion of the population who choose to supporter faction j ∈ {t, s}.
The splinter leader has to choose whether or not to splinter. Since the splinter leader is taken not to have ideological motivations, his payoff, should he not splinter, is normalized to zero. Later, I consider an extension in which the payoff from not splintering is dependent on the state of the economy. If the splinter leader does splinter, his expected payoff is:
where k is the cost of splintering.
The original terrorist leader makes her choice of a location on the ideological dimension under uncertainty. In particular, she does not know the splinter faction's capacity for providing nonideological benefits (β s ) to its members. Her prior beliefs are that β s is distributed according to a distribution G, with support [0, β s ]. The original terrorist leader's expected payoff is:
Discussion of Assumptions
Several of the assumptions underlying this model merit further elaboration.
It is worth commenting on the interpretation of the ideological positions chosen by the two factional leaders (i.e., x t and x s ). One can think of these as a faction's statement of demands, its willingness to compromise with the government, the level of violence it intends to use, and so on. Kydd and Walter (2002), and Bueno de Mesquita (2005a,c) ). This paper, however, abstracts away from those issues to focus on ideological splintering.
Note, further, that I restrict the splinter leader's ideological choice. In particular it must be contained in [x t + , ∞). This implies that I am only studying splinter factions that are more extreme than the original terrorist faction. I do so because it is generally extremist splinter factions that form during the course of terrorist conflicts. This is because the more moderate end of the ideological spectrum is usually already dense with political organizations.
The restriction that the splinter faction can only locate within of the original faction is for technical convenience. As will become clear later, the splinter faction may, for some parameter values, want to locate as close as possible to the original group. If I were to allow x s ∈ (x t , ∞), the open set would create an equilibrium existence problem for these parameter values. However, the problem is an artifact of the continuum. In an arbitrarily dense, but finite, space there would be no existence problem. Since the action space is assumed to be a continuum simply for analytic convenience, it does not make sense to allow idiosyncratic features of the continuum to effect the predictions of the model. Hence, I discretize the space in the one place that matters by assuming that the splinter faction cannot locate within some arbitrarily small of the original group.
Several assumptions regarding the population members and the terrorist factions' leaders bear comment. Each member of the population of potential terrorists is taken to have two outside options-the economy and the radical outside option-for reasons of substantive verisimilitude.
The option to participate in the economy is a natural alternative to joining a terrorist faction.
The idea behind the radical outside option is as follows. As will become clear, there will be some members of society who are so extreme that they do not want to join a terrorist faction because even the terrorists are too moderate. It does not make intuitive sense to think that these people will, therefore, simply return to economic life. Instead, they will participate in radical politics, just not through an organized group. They may attempt to form their own violent cells or engage in individual acts of violence. 2 It is also this intuition that justifies the further assumption on preferences which guarantees that members of the population with ideologies that are more extreme than a terrorist faction's ideology prefer the radical outside option to participating in the economy.
I made two assumptions that jointly implied that people who are willing to become terrorists have ideologies that are more extreme than the mean ideology in society. While there is some evidence that in some societies the person with the mean ideology supports terrorist attacks in public opinion polls (see, Krueger and Maleckova (2003) for data on this among Palestinians), even in such societies it seems unlikely that the mean person is willing to become a terrorist.
The final assumption on the potential terrorists' preference was the single-crossing relationship between the radical outside option and the ideological payoffs from joining a terrorist faction. In particular, as a population member's ideology becomes more moderate than a terrorist faction's ideology, the payoff of joining that terrorist faction diminishes at a rate that is faster than the rate at which that population member's payoff from the radical outside option diminishes. Intuitively, this is because joining a terrorist faction involves accepting the faction's particular ideology, whereas the terms of the radical outside option can, by its nature, be determined by the individual.
With respect to the factional leaders, there are three key assumptions. First, the potential splinter leader bears a cost if he chooses to splinter. The idea, here, is that splintering carries the risk of retribution from the original faction and, thus, is costly to the splinter leader in expectation.
Second, each terrorist faction's leader is able to provide group-specific, non-ideological payoffs (the βs). The idea is that terrorist operatives are motivated not only by ideology, but also by non-ideological payoffs, and that different terrorist factions differ in their ability to provide these non-ideological benefits (Stern 2003) . The difference between β t and β s could reflect a variety of factors, such as the charisma of the leaders, the level of private goods the two factions can afford to provide their members, opportunities for graft and personal gain, and so on. The original faction leader's uncertainty regarding the splinter faction leader's ability to provide non-ideological benefits could be because she does not know who will emerge as the splinter leader or how well funded that person will be.
Third, terrorist leaders seek to maximize the membership of their faction, but do not have direct preferences over ideology or policy outcomes. Clearly, in reality, terrorist leaders are motivated by a range of factors including power, money, policy outcomes, religion, and so on. However, 2 Of course, such people may also try to form a new terrorist faction themselves. I do not model the process of repeated splintering here, but the dynamics would be similar to the results in this model. One can, in fact, think of this model as simply being an analysis of the "current" splinter group. At some point, as we will see, there may be too few of these non-affiliated radical activists to actually sustain a new terrorist faction.
attracting adherents is a necessary condition for establishing a successful terrorist faction. Thus, terrorist leaders' policy motivations and desire for power will, at least in part, induce the preferences over membership that I assume. I abstract away from direct differences in ideological or policy preferences between the terrorist leaders to focus on the strategic problem of attracting support to a splinter faction and how the problem of recruitment and support affects the strategy of terrorist leaders. This leaves the model tractable and, it turns out, direct ideological disagreement between the leaders is not necessary to create incentives for ideological divergence between the two factions.
Moreover, since terrorist leaders surely have preferences over attracting members, among other things, the effects I identify will persist in a more complete model that incorporates additional motivations (though there may be other, offsetting effects).
Equilibrium
The solution concept is subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (extended to games with moves by Nature).
Affiliation Decisions
Assuming a splinter has occurred, and given an ideological position and a non-ideological payoff for each of the two terrorist factions (x t , x s , β t , β s ), a member of the population will join faction j ∈ {s, t} if two constraints are satisfied. First, the population member must weakly prefer joining faction j to refraining from joining the terrorist movement entirely. This constraint, which I refer to as the terrorist participation constraint (TP), is given by:
Second, the member of the population must prefer faction j to the other faction (−j). This constraint, which I refer to as the factional choice constraint (FC), is given by:
It will be useful, at this point, to introduce a bit of terminology. 
To build intuition, notice that if there was only one terrorist faction (j), then one of the TP constraints would always bind on each side. A potential member to the left of x j would only join if
be the x i such that this condition holds with equality. Because, by assumption, the radical outside option is preferred to the economy by population members with ideologies to the right of a terrorist faction, a potential member to the right of x j would only join if
be the x i such that this condition holds with equality. A person with ideological position
is indifferent between joining terrorist faction j and taking his most preferred outside option. I assume such a person joins his most preferred faction.
The total membership of the single faction j would be
Notice that how the bounds of faction j's membership are determined depends both on the state of the economy γ and the attractiveness of the radical outside option (ρ(·)). Figure 1 illustrates the two possible scenarios. In the left-hand cell, the economic TP constraint binds on the faction's left, and the radical outside option TP constraint binds on the faction's right. In the right-hand cell, the radical outside option TP constraint binds on both sides. 
(1)
Given parameter values, whether or not the FC constraint binds is a function of how ideologically disparate the two factions are. The two panels of Figure Given all of this, the affiliation decisions of the population can be characterized as follows. Proof. The proof is the argument in the text.
It is also worth noting that, in equilibrium, these affiliation decisions are monotonic in an important sense. As one moves from left to right in the ideological space, population members move from not affiliating with either faction, to preferring the original faction, to preferring the splinter faction (should it exist), to not affiliating with either faction in order to pursue the radical outside option. This monotonicity is summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 2 If a population member with ideology x i < x t does not join the original faction, then
neither will any population member with ideology x i ≤ x i . If a population member with ideology
not join either the original faction or the splinter faction (if it exists), then neither
will any population member with ideology
Note that the left-hand panel of Figure 2 violates this monotonicity result. As will be shown in Lemma 3, this is because the configuration of factional ideological positions shown in the left-hand panel of Figure 2 never occurs in equilibrium.
The Splinter Group's Location
Suppose a splinter group has emerged. Given the affiliation decisions discussed above, how will the splinter group position itself ideologically? The splinter group faces a trade-off. On the one hand, as it becomes more extreme (moves to the right), it increases the number of adherents it attracts on its right wing. On the other hand, as it becomes more moderate (moves to the left), it takes away members from the other faction and it moves the interval defining its membership into a part of the ideological space where the density of potential members is greater.
Definex s as the point where the TP constraint just binds on the splinter group's left and the original group's right. Figure 3 illustrates the location ofx s .
The splinter group never has an incentive to position itself to the right of the point where the TP constraint just binds on its left. At this point, the size of the interval defining the splinter group's membership and the density of potential members are decreasing monotonically.
Lemma 3 The optimal x s satisfies x s ≤x s .
The objective of the splinter group leader, should he choose to splinter, is to maximize his group's membership. Thus, he solves:
The optimal ideological position for the splinter group is characterized in the following result.
Lemma 4 The optimal ideological position for the splinter faction is
where
for some
Lemma 4 shows that, at an interior solution, the optimal ideological position, x * s , is characterized by the first-order condition in equation (2). The marginal cost of choosing a more extreme ideological position is that moving to the right shifts the lower bound of the splinter faction's support to the right, decreasing membership on the faction's left wing. The amount it moves the lower bound is given by
∂xs . The number of population members who change affiliations from the splinter group to the original faction as a result of this shift is given by the density at the lower
. The marginal benefit of choosing a more extreme ideology is that doing so shifts the upper bound of the splinter group's adherents to the right. The amount the upper bound moves is
The number of adherents gained on the faction's right wing by increasing x s a small amount is given by the density at the upper bound,
. These marginal costs and benefits are illustrated in Figure 4 .
From this, we can determine how the splinter faction's ideological position is affected by the ideological position adopted by the original terrorist faction. As the original group becomes more extreme, it is able to recruit more of the contested adherents. Consequently, the marginal cost of extremism is decreasing for the splinter faction. The marginal benefit is unaffected. Thus, as the original terrorist faction becomes more extreme, it pushes the splinter faction to become more extreme as well. 
Remark 1 If the splinter leader decides to form a splinter faction, the splinter faction's ideological location (x * s ) is increasing in the ideological location of the original terror faction (x t ).

Whether or Not to Splinter
The previous subsection demonstrates what a splinter leader will do, should he decide to form a splinter faction. However, splintering is costly to the splinter leader. Thus, not all potential splinter leaders will choose to splinter.
The splinter leader will form a new faction only if he can attract enough adherents to make it worth the costs of splintering. That is, if
Two strategic facts emerge from this. First, the ideological location of the original terrorist faction affects the likelihood that an extremist splinter faction will arise. As demonstrated in Remark 1, as the original terrorist faction becomes more extreme, it pushes the splinter faction to the extremes as well. This reduces the splinter leader's payoff from splintering by reducing the number of adherents he attracts. Thus, the original faction's leader can reduce the risk of a splinter faction forming by becoming more extreme.
Proposition 1 The more extreme is the original terrorist faction, the less likely a splinter faction is to form.
Second, splinter leaders who are able to provide a high level of non-ideological benefits to their members (high β s ) are more likely to splinter. When the splinter faction's capacity to provide non-ideological benefits is large, the splinter faction competes more successfully with the original terrorist faction for contested adherents. This means that the total membership the splinter group can attract is larger, making it more likely that the potential leader will find the benefit of splintering worth the costs.
Proposition 2
The larger the level of non-ideological benefits the splinter leader can provide (higher β s ), the more likely a splinter faction is to form.
The Original Terrorist Faction's Location
The original terrorist leader has to choose an ideological location under uncertainty. She does not know whether a splinter faction will form because she is uncertain what level of non-ideological benefits the splinter leader will be able to provide. Moreover, this same uncertainty implies that, even if a splinter forms, the original faction's leader does not know where it will locate. As will be discussed below, it is important to note that the existence of a splinter faction is not contingent on the presence of this uncertainty.
Recall that the payoff to the splinter leader is decreasing in the extremism of the original faction and increasing in his ability to provide non-ideological benefits. Hence, if the original terrorist leader knew the level of non-ideological benefits the splinter leader could provide, she could choose a location just extreme enough to dissuade the splinter leader from actually splintering. Label this level of extremism on the part of the original terrorist factionx t (β s ). For a fixed level of non-ideological benefits associated with the splinter faction (β s ), it is implicitly defined by:
Since the payoff from splintering, given parameter values, is strictly increasing in β s ,x t is a random variable that is uniquely determined by the realization of β s . Letβ s (x t ) be the β s such that
It is worth noting that although, in the absence of uncertainty, the original faction's leader could always choose a position that deters splintering, the existence of a splinter faction is not dependent on the presence of uncertainty about β s . This is because, if the potential splinter leader has a relatively good capacity for providing non-ideological benefits (high β s ), deterring the splinter would require the original faction leader to choose a fairly extreme ideology, foregoing many adherents on its left. The original faction's leader may not be willing to pay this price to prevent a splinter from forming. Hence, even if the original faction's leader had full information, a splinter faction would still sometimes emerge in equilibrium.
Given his preferences and information, the original terrorist leader chooses an ideological loca-tion to solve the following:
This objective reflects the two contingencies the original terrorist leader takes into account when choosing her ideological location. In the first contingency no splinter faction forms (if β s ∈ [0,β s (x t ))). In this case, the TP constraint binds on both sides of the original faction, since there is only one operative terrorist faction. In the second contingency a splinter faction does form (if
. In this case, the TP constraint binds on the original faction's left and the FC constraint binds on its right.
Taking first-order conditions and rearranging shows that the optimal choice at an interior solution is characterized by:
Increased extremism on the part of the original terrorist faction has four effects on the marginal payoffs of the original terrorist faction's leader. These can be seen in the four terms of the left-hand side of the first-order condition.
Increasing the extremism of the original group adds members on the original group's right. How many it adds depends on whether or not there is a splinter group. If the splinter leader does not form a splinter faction (which occurs with probability G(β s (x * * t ))), then by increasing its extremism the original faction adds members on its right simply because a more extreme faction is palatable to more extreme members of the population. This component of the marginal benefit is represented by the first term of equation (4). If, alternatively, the splinter leader does splinter, then the original faction gains members on its right as it becomes more extreme for two reasons. First, there is the same direct effect as abovea more extreme original faction is more attractive to more extreme members of the population.
Second, by becoming more extreme itself, the original faction pushes the splinter faction further to the extreme. In so doing, the splinter faction concedes additional contested adherents to the original faction. How large these effects are depends on the level of non-ideological benefits the splinter leader is able to provide. This component of the marginal benefit is represented by the second term of equation (4).
By increasing her faction's extremism, the original faction's leader also decreases the probability that a splinter faction will form. If the splinter group is dissuaded from forming, the original faction gains those contested adherents who were joining the splinter faction. This component of the marginal benefit can be seen in the third term of equation (4).
Whether or not there is a splinter group, an increase in the original group's extremism imposes the same marginal costs. In particular, by increasing its extremism the original group loses some adherents from its moderate wing (i.e., on its left). This marginal cost can be seen in the last term in equation (4).
At an interior optimum, the ideological position of the original faction balances these costs and benefits. If the marginal costs are always larger than the marginal benefits, there is a corner solution at x t = x t . Moreover, as explained below, there is a well defined upper bound on how extreme the original terrorist faction will consider becoming.
Letx t be the level of extremism by the original terrorist group that would dissuade splintering even by a splinter leader who was able to provide the maximal level of non-ideological benefits (i.e., x t ≡x t (β s )). If the original faction's leader chooses an ideological position at least as extreme aŝ x t , she knows that there will be no splinter. Consequently, choosing a location more extreme than x t is counterproductive. To the right ofx t there is no longer any benefit in terms of dissuading a splinter group. The only benefit is in terms of adding members on the right flank. But there are fewer potential members on the right than on the left. Thus, the original faction's leader will never choose an ideological position to the right ofx t .
Lemma 5
The optimal x t satisfies x t ≤x t .
Given this, the optimal ideological location of the original terrorist faction is characterized by the following lemma.
Lemma 6
The optimal ideological position of the original terrorist faction is given by:
is implicitly defined by equation (4).
Having solved for each player's best response, it is now possible to characterize the equilibrium of the game.
Proposition 3 There is a unique equilibrium of the game. In that equilibrium, each member of the population behaves according to the strategy specified in Lemma 1, the splinter leader (should he splinter) chooses an ideological location as specified in Lemma 4 and choose to splinter if 
The Determinants of Ideology and Splintering
In this section I explore how changes in some key parameters of the model affect the likelihood of a splinter faction forming and the ideological positions adopted by the factions.
The Economy
Changes in the state of the economy (γ) can affect the ideological positions of the factions and the likelihood of splintering. Notice, first, that since the radical alternative, rather than the economic, TP constraint binds on a splinter faction's right, should such a faction emerge, the economy has no direct effect on its ideological position. The economy can, however, affect the position adopted by the original terrorist faction, which, as shown in Remark 1, then affects the splinter faction's location and the decision about whether or not to splinter.
How, then, does a change in the economy affect the ideological position of the original terrorist faction? Whether or not a splinter faction forms, the economic TP constraint can bind on the original terrorist faction's left but not on its right. That is, the only people who might consider not joining the terrorist organization in order to remain in the normal economy are the most moderate potential terrorists. If the economic TP constraint binds on the original faction's left, then when the economy improves the original terrorist faction recruits fewer people from its moderate wing because those people are more attracted to remaining in the regular economy. As a result of this, the marginal cost of extremism decreases-by becoming more extreme, the original faction sacrifices fewer adherents on its left when the economy is strong than when it is weak. Since the economic constraint does not bind on the original faction's right, the marginal benefit of extremism is unaffected. 3 Consequently, when the economy improves, the original terrorist faction becomes more extreme. This is illustrated in Figure 5 .
The increased extremism of the original terrorist faction caused by an improvement in the economy also has an effect on the behavior of the splinter faction. First, as shown in Proposition 1, when the original faction becomes more extreme, the probability that there will be a splinter faction decreases. Thus, an improvement in the economy indirectly diminishes the probability of a splinter faction emerging. Second, as shown in Remark 1, if a splinter faction does emerge, it will locate in a more extreme position as a result of the original faction's increased extremism.
The following result formalizes these intuitions.
Proposition 4 If the economic TP constraint binds on the original faction's left (γ ≥ ρ(x T P t )), then an improvement in the economy (higher γ) increases the extremism of the original faction, decreases the probability of the splinter group forming, and, conditional on a splinter group forming, increases the extremism of the splinter group. If the economic TP constraint does not bind on the original faction's left (γ < ρ(x T P t ))
, then an improvement in the economy has no effect.
Individuals who leave t when it shifts from x t to x' t and economy is γ but not γ'.
' γ Individuals who leave t when it shifts from x t to x' t and economy is γ or γ'.
Individuals who leave t when it shifts from x t to x' t and economy is γ' but not γ.
γ Figure 5 : The marginal cost of increased extremism by the original terrorist faction (from x t to x t ) is lower under a strong economy (γ ) than under a weak economy (γ).
This result speaks to recent debates over whether facilitating economic growth is an important tool for limiting terrorism. Moreover, as the original faction becomes more extreme, an internal split within the terrorist organization becomes less likely. This may be good from the government's perspective, since radical splinters can spoil peace negotiations (Stedman 1997; Kydd and Walter 2002) . But it may also be bad for the government because internal divisions can sometimes be exploited to make credible negotiation between moderate terrorists and the government possible, driving a wedge in the terrorist organization and enhancing security (Bueno de Mesquita 2005a,c). 5 In either case, the government, when considering the importance of economic stimulus as a tool for fighting terror, faces a trade-off between a variety of effects of economic growth: decreased mobilization, increased extremism, and decreased likelihood of internal divisions.
The model, then, is consistent with empirical work, such as Abadie (2004) , that finds little direct effect of the economy on aggregate measures of terrorist violence. 6 However, the analysis also suggests that such findings do not necessarily imply that changes in the economy have no effect on terrorist decision making and terrorist organizations. Rather, the economy has important and complex effects that, because they are offsetting, may not be identifiable in aggregate data.
The Costs of Splintering
Splintering from a terrorist organization is a risky endeavor. Terrorist organizations regularly impose severe penalties on former members suspected of disloyalty. Chai (1993) , for instance, describes the Japanese Red Army Faction's brutal murder, through burial in snow, of 14 of its members who were deemed disloyal. Similarly, following the bombing of Omagh, the Provisional IRA threatened to execute members of splinter groups who did not comport with Provisional negotiated cease fires (Dingley 1999) .
Perhaps the most important determinant of the original organization's ability to impose costs on splinter groups is the level of centralization within the terrorist movement. In order to diminish the risk of infiltration, most terror groups are organized into somewhat decentralized cells (Chai 1993; Crenshaw 1981) . However, there is variance in the degree of decentralization among terrorist movements. For instance, groups such as the IRA, ETA, and Hamas are divided into fairly autonomous cells, but they also have centralized commands that set strategy, allocate budgets, and so on. al Qaeda has taken decentralization much further, creating a network of only loosely affiliated factions and cells with a highly decentralized command apparatus (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001;
Zanini and Edwards 2001).
The more decentralized a terrorist organization, the less able the leadership is to monitor the behavior of its cells, making it more difficult to identify and punish defectors. Thus, organizational structure can play an important role in determining the likelihood of splintering and, consequently, the level of extremism in the terrorist organization. The question remains, however, exactly what the relationship between the costs of splintering, the likelihood of splintering, and the ideological location of the terrorist factions is.
Given an ideological position for the original terrorist faction, the higher the expected cost of splintering (k), the less likely a splinter group is to emerge. Intuitively, one might think, then, that an increase in the cost of splintering would lead the original terrorist faction to be less extreme, since it does not need to try as hard to deter a splinter faction. However, this need not be the case.
The key to understanding why is to focus on the effect of a change in the costs of splintering on the marginal costs and benefits to the original terrorist group of becoming more extreme.
Implicit differentiation shows that the effect of an increase in the costs of splintering on the extremism of the original faction has the same sign as:
The intuition for equation (5) is as follows. The original group's marginal costs from increased extremism are the potential adherents it loses on its left wing. These costs are the same regardless of whether or not there is a splinter group, since the original group is not competing on its left with the splinter group. Thus, the marginal costs from equation (4) do not appear in equation (5), since a change in the cost of splintering has no effect on them.
Recall that the original terror faction gains two types of marginal benefits by increasing its extremism. First, by becoming more extreme the original group adds adherents on its right wing, whether or not there is a splinter. Second, when the original group becomes more extreme, it decreases the probability of a splinter group forming. I consider the effect of an increase in the costs of splintering on each of these marginal benefits in turn.
When the original faction becomes more extreme, it adds adherents on its right. The number of adherents it adds on its right, however, depends on whether or not a splinter faction formed.
As the costs that the splinter leader bears for splintering (k) increase, the probability that there will be a splinter group decreases. Suppose that increased extremism is expected to add more members to the original faction when there is a splinter faction. Then an increase in the costs of splintering would decrease the expected number of new adherents the original faction would gain through increased extremism. Alternatively, suppose that increased extremism is expected to add more members to the original faction when there in not a splinter faction. Then an increase in the costs of splintering would increase the expected number of new adherents the original faction would gain through increased extremism. Thus, whether this component of the marginal benefit is increasing or decreasing in the costs of splintering depends on whether increased extremism leads to more new adherents for the original faction with or without a splinter.
It turns out that one cannot say, in general, whether the original faction garners more new adherents by increasing its extremism when there is or is not a splinter faction. On the one hand, because the splinter faction creates contested adherents, increased extremism adds adherents to the original faction in a part of the ideological space that is more dense with people when there is a splinter faction (i.e., f (x T P t ) < f (x F C T )). On the other hand, whether increased extremism makes the original faction acceptable to more new ideologies with or without a splinter faction is ambiguous. The upper bound of support for the original faction when there is no splinter is determined by the population's ideological preferences (u(·)) and the radical outside option (ρ(·)).
When there is a splinter, the upper bound is again a function of ideological preferences and the radical outside option, but now at both the upper bound for the original group as well as at the upper bound for the splinter group, since the splinter group's optimal response to an increase in the original group's extremism also plays a role. Without making strong, substantively unmotivated, additional assumptions about functional forms, one cannot determine whether the upper bound moves more in response to increased extremism with or without a splinter.
Matters become even more complicated when one considers the second component of the original faction's marginal benefit for increased extremism. By becoming more extreme, the original faction decreases the likelihood of a splinter forming. The question, here, is whether the size of this decrease in the likelihood of facing a splinter becomes larger or smaller when the costs of splintering increase.
If it becomes smaller, then the marginal benefit of extremism is reduced. If it becomes bigger, then the marginal benefit of extremism is increased.
As can be seen in the last term in equation (5), the answer to this question depends on the distribution of the splinter faction's ability to provide non-ideological benefits. The splinter leader will form a splinter faction if he can provide non-ideological benefits of at leastβ s . As the cost of splintering increases, so doesβ s . Suppose that the density of β s (g(·)) was truncated normal on The preceding arguments shows that the intuition that an increase in the costliness of splintering will always cause the original terrorist group to moderate is incorrect. Instead, higher costs of splintering can have either effect, depending on the distribution of non-ideological benefits for the splinter group and the functional forms of the potential adherents ideological preferences and their radical outside option.
Observation 1 As the cost of splintering increases, the extremism of the original group may increase or decrease.
This discussion highlights a more fundamental, and perhaps counterintuitive, implication of the model. Deterring the creation of a splinter faction is one of the benefits of extremism for the original faction. Nonetheless, any factor that exogenously increases the probability of the splinter group emerging can lead to an increase or a decrease in the extremism of the original terrorist faction, depending on the relative size of the marginal benefits of extremism when there is or is not a splinter faction.
Non-Ideological Benefits from the Terrorist Factions
Both terrorist factions provide adherents with non-ideological benefits. These may be due to the charisma of the leader, private goods provided to members, opportunities to engage in self-enriching criminal behavior, etc. Different factions and leaders are able to provide different levels of these non-ideological payoffs depending on their personal attributes, the resources to which they have access, and other idiosyncracies of the particular conflict and factions. Changes in the factions' capacities to provide non-ideological payoffs affect the choices the terrorist leaders make.
As discussed in Proposition 2, a splinter leader who is able to provide a high level of nonideological benefits competes more successfully with the original terrorist faction for contested adherents. This means that the total membership the splinter group can attract is larger, making it more likely that the potential leader will find the risk of splintering worth the costs. The question remains, however, how a shift in the ability to provide non-ideological benefits affects the ideological position adopted by the splinter leader.
Implicit differentiation of equation (2) shows that, at an interior solution, an increase in the splinter leader's ability to provide non-ideological benefits has an effect on the splinter group's ideological position that has the same sign as:
The first two terms of equation (6) represent the effect of an increase in the splinter leader's ability to provide non-ideological benefits on the marginal benefit of extremism. The marginal benefit, to the splinter leader, of an increase in extremism is the number of people added on her right wing as a result of the move. Two factors determine the size of this marginal benefit: (i ) the number (density) of people located at the upper bound of the splinter group's support (f (x T P s )) and (ii ) how much the upper bound of the group's support moves in response to an increase in the group's ideological position (
). Multiplying these two components together gives the adherents added on the right-wing as a result of an increase in extremism.
An increase in the splinter leader's ability to provide non-ideological benefits affects both of these components of the marginal benefit of extremism. First, the more non-ideological benefits the splinter faction can provide, the further into the extreme it can recruit. Hence, the density of people located at the upper bound of the splinter faction's support is smaller. This effect implies that when the splinter faction has the capacity to provide a high level of non-ideological benefits, becoming more extreme garners relatively fewer new adherents, since adherents are being added in a part of the ideological space where there are fewer people. As can be seen in the first term of equation (6), this tends to diminish the marginal benefit of becoming more extreme
Second, the more non-ideological benefits the splinter faction can provide, the larger the impact of a small increase in ideology on the faction's ability to recruit adherents on its right. That is, the upper bound of the splinter faction's support moves more in response to a small increase in extremism. Contrary to the previous effect, this effect implies that when the splinter faction has the capacity to provide a high level of non-ideological benefits, becoming more extreme garners relatively more adherents. This is because the range of ideological preferences that are added by an increase in extremism is larger. As can be seen in the second term of equation (6), this tends to increase the marginal benefit of becoming more extreme (f (x T P s )
The two preceding paragraphs show that an increase in the ability of the splinter leader to provide non-ideological benefits has an ambiguous effect on the marginal benefit of extremism. Put simply, the marginal benefit of extremism is the rise (the density of people at the upper bound)
times the run (how far the upper bound moves). As β s becomes larger, the rise decreases but the run increases. It is not possible to say, generally, which effect is larger.
There are similar competing effects with respect to the marginal costs of extremism. Again, there are two components of the marginal cost of extremism: (i ) the number (density) of people at the lower bound (f (x F C s ) and (ii ) how far the lower bound moves in response to an increase in extremism (
The more non-ideological benefits the splinter group is able to provide, the more effectively it can compete for contested adherents. Hence, the density of people at the lower bound is larger (larger rise). This effect tends to increase the marginal cost of extremism(f (x F C s )
∂βs > 0). However, just as with the marginal benefit, there is an offsetting effect. When the splinter group is better able to provide non-ideological benefits, a small increase in ideological extremism has less of an impact on its ability to recruit adherents on its left. That is, the lower bound of the splinter faction's support moves less in response to an increase in the splinter faction's extremism (smaller run). This effect tends to decrease the marginal cost of extremism (f (x F C s )
These two effects pull in opposite directions. Thus, it is ambiguous whether an increase in the ability of the splinter faction to provide non-ideological benefits increases or decreases the marginal costs of extremism.
Putting all of this together yields the following observation.
Observation 2 While an increase in the ability of the splinter faction to provide non-ideological
benefits increases the probability of a splinter faction forming, it has an ambiguous effect on the splinter faction's ideological position.
∈ (0, 1), and
), and
This observation highlights a subtlety in the determination of terrorist ideology that could be important for both empirical research and policy. In particular, the strategic logic outlined above indicates that there is not a simple relationship between a faction's ability to provide for its adherents and the ideology it will pursue. Rather, an increase in a faction's capacity to provide nonideological benefits pulls in multiple directions. Determining whether it will increase or decrease a faction's extremism depends on the magnitude of the various effects.
The model, then, indicates that understanding the effect of the ability to provide non-ideological benefits on ideological extremism must be estimated on a case by case basis. Compare, for example, two radical terrorist factions from different conflicts: Hamas and the Real IRA. For much of their histories, both factions have pursued uncompromising, extremist ideologies. Yet Hamas is a large, successful organization that provides a variety of non-ideological benefits to its adherents in the form of salaries, social services, and so on (Mishal and Sela 2000) . The Real IRA, on the other hand, is an underfunded group that has struggled to even provide its operatives with the resources to procure weapons and carry out attacks (Toolis 2001) . Whether either would become more or less extreme in response to a change in capacity for providing non-ideological benefits, however, depends on which of the effects identified above dominates. This can only be determined by studying the idiosyncracies of each case.
The effects of an increase in the original faction's ability to provide non-ideological benefits are also ambiguous. Such an increase has a variety of effects. Like with the splinter group, an increase in the original group's capacity for providing non-ideological benefits has an ambiguous effect on the number of adherents gained and lost as a result of an increase in extremism. Moreover, there is another complication. For a fixed ideological position on the part of the original faction, an increase in the non-ideological benefits the original faction can provide decreases the probability that a splinter faction will emerge at all. And, as was shown in the previous section, the effect of such a change on the ideological position of the original faction is ambiguous. Thus, it is not possible to cleanly characterize the effect of an increase in the original faction's ability to provide non-ideological benefits on its ideological location.
The Structure and Stability of Terrorist Movements
In this section, I explore additional implications of the model for the internal politics of terrorist organizations.
Two Forms of Inter-Factional Conflict
Competing terrorist factions often come into conflict with one another. The existence of interfactional competition and internecine fighting plays an important role in understanding the dynamics of terrorism (Bloom 2004 (Bloom , 2005 Kydd and Walter 2002; Siqueira 2005) . The spatial logic presented here highlights a heretofore overlooked subtlety in the conceptualization of the causes of inter-factional conflict. There are, in the model, two possible sources of tension between factions: ideological divergence and competition for contested adherents. Avoiding one of these two types of conflict comes at the price of exacerbating the other.
Consider, again, Figure 4 . For a fixed position of the original faction, as the splinter faction becomes more ideologically extreme, moving from x s to x s , ideological conflict (over, say, goals or the optimal level of violence) between the two factions increases for two reasons. First, the stated ideological positions of the two organizations are further apart. Second, the memberships of the two factions are more polarized on the ideological dimension. If ideological disagreement is the source of inter-factional violence, then any factor that increases incentives for the splinter group to move to the right will exacerbate such conflict.
However, there is a second effect of a move to the ideological extreme by the splinter group. The set of contested adherents shrinks. Bloom (2004 Bloom ( , 2005 argues that competition among factions for adherents is one of the major determinants not only of internecine violence, but of terrorist escalation in general. Moreover, the model suggest one way in which internecine violence might play a role in competition for adherents. If attacks by one faction against another diminish the attractiveness of joining the target faction (i.e., diminish that faction's β), this will decrease the share of the contested adherents the targeted faction is able to attract. Thus, terrorism and interfactional violence may actually diminish with an increase in ideological distance between the two factions, if competition for adherents is the source of such violence.
Of course, the present model is silent as to which type of inter-factional conflict actually causes internecine violence or terrorism more generally. The model simply highlights the fact that inter-factional conflict can take multiple forms-ideological divergence or competition for contested adherents-and shows that factors that increase one of these decrease the other.
Ideological Skew
To the extent that the internal organization of terrorist groups is important for understanding the politics of terrorism, an interesting question is whether terrorist factions tend to be ideologically skewed. That is, does the ideology set forth by a terrorist faction's leaders define the middle ground within that faction? If not, one might think that such ideological skew could become a source of tension and instability within terrorist organizations. As discussed earlier (and illustrated in Figure 1 ), in the absence of a splinter faction, the original terrorist faction's membership consists of all population members in the set [x T Pthe membership of the organization will extend further to the left than to the right. Moreover, since the density of people is decreasing, this also implies that there will be more total members in the left wing of the faction than the right. Hence, if there is no splinter, the original faction's membership is skewed to the left under both criteria: the left wing is larger than the right wing and the most left-wing member of the left wing is further from the faction's position than the most right-wing member of the right wing.
When there is a splinter the two factions divide the contested adherents. As can be seen in Figure 3 , this censors the membership of the splinter group on the left and the membership of the original group on the right. Thus, when there is a splinter faction, the original faction becomes even more skewed to the left, as part of its right wing is coopted by the splinter. The splinter faction will also typically fail to satisfy either criteria. It is not possible, however, to say generally whether the right-or left-wing of the splinter faction will be larger or more extreme.
Consider, first, whether the most right-or left-wing member is further from the faction's ideological position. The most left-wing member is defined by the point where a member of the population is just indifferent between the two factions. The most right-wing member is defined by the point where a member of the population is just indifferent between the splinter faction and the radical outside option. Since the payoff from the radical outside option is increasing, it is not possible to say which bound is closer to the splinter faction's ideological position, without imposing functional form restrictions on u(·) and ρ(·). Moreover, since it is unclear which wing is larger, it is also not possible to rank the relative size of the two wings. Thus, while the splinter faction will typically be skewed, which direction depends on the particular case.
The Splinter Leader's Outside Option: An Extension I have assumed, thus far, that the splinter leader receives a payoff of zero if she does not form a splinter faction. That is, the decision over whether to splinter simply involves a comparison of the direct benefits and costs of doing so.
Since both terrorist leaders were assumed not to be directly motivated by ideology, I argued, this is a reasonable assumption. However, another approach would be to let the splinter leader's outside option be a function of the state of the economy. In particular, suppose that, if the splinter leader does not form a splinter faction, her payoff is simply γ.
This change affects only one result, the comparative statics on the state of the economy in Proposition 4. Now an improvement in the economy has a direct effect on the behavior of the splinter leader-it makes him less likely to splinter for any given position of the original faction.
As was discussed in the section on the costs of splintering, anything that exogenously changes the probability of a splinter forming has competing effects on the ideological position chosen by the original faction. The effects identified in Proposition 4 persist-an improvement in the economy pushes the original faction to the extremes which pushes the splinter faction to the extremes and diminishes the likelihood of splintering. However, there is now a new effect, whose impact is ambiguous.
Thus, this change in specification can alter the comparative statics on the economy. In order to do so, however, two conditions must hold. First, it must be the case that the decreased likelihood of a splinter forming associated with an improvement in the economy actually pushes the original faction to the left (recall, the sign of this effect is ambiguous). Second, given this, the change in the probability of a splinter forming due to an improvement in the economy must loom large in the original leader's strategic calculus relative to the change in her ability to recruit adherents on the left due to an improvement in the economy.
Conclusion
I have presented a model of the splintering of a terrorist group in which affiliation decisions, ideological locations, and the existence of a splinter faction are endogenous and terrorist leaders are motivated by the desire to attract members. The model yields a number of results concerning the nature of inter-factional conflict, and factors that affect the ideological extremism of terrorist factions, the likelihood of a splinter group emerging, the level of mobilization, and the ideological balance of factionalized terrorist organizations.
The model presented here is intended as only one step in the ongoing project of unpacking the internal politics of terrorist organizations. Clearly, it is incomplete in a variety of important ways.
Most obviously, I have not considered several of the strategic decisions that are at the heart of terrorist politics. The model is silent on how ideological positions translate into levels of violence and counterterrorism (Berrebi and Klor 2004; Bueno de Mesquita 2005a) , willingness to negotiate and compromise (Lapan and Sandler 1988; Kydd and Walter 2002; Bueno de Mesquita 2005a) , the types of tactics terrorists choose (Rosendorff and Sandler 2004) , the willingness of group members to sacrifice for the organization (Berman 2003; Azam 2005) , or the ability to secure the resources necessary to engage in a campaign of terror. Moreover, there is no government and, thus, the model does not address how counterterrorism policy might affect affiliation decisions by the population (Rosendorff and Sandler 2004; Bueno de Mesquita 2005b) or the positions taken by the terrorist factions (de Figueiredo and Weingast 2001) . Finally, the model assumes that terrorist leaders are motivated by a desire to attract adherents. While that is surely one of their motivations, their are a variety of other factors that influence terrorist leaders' behavior, such as true ideological motivations, rent-seeking, and signaling to donors or the government (Lapan and Sandler 1993; Overgaard 1994) . Future research will have to integrate strategic concerns regarding how terrorist campaigns are carried out with factors affecting the internal structure and politics of terrorist organizations themselves, such as those explored in this paper.
The goal of the paper, of course, was not to provide a complete model of recruitment, splintering, and the strategic use of terror. I abstracted away from important issues in order to be able to explicitly model the strategic selection of ideological positions by terrorist leaders and the decision about whether or not to form a splinter faction. The analysis yields predictions regarding factors that effect the likelihood and extent of ideological splintering, the ideological positions taken by the leaders of terrorist factions, and the structural and institutional sources of conflict within terrorist groups. In so doing, the model helps provide micro-foundations for the ideological heterogeneity of terror groups, which has played an important role in recent models of the politics of terrorism.
Appendix Proof of Lemma 2
If a population member with x i < x t does not join t, this implies that
Suppose, first, that γ > ρ(x i ). Then the left-hand side is constant in x i and the right-hand side is decreasing as x i decreases. Hence, the inequality continues to hold for all x i < x i .
Suppose, now, that ρ(x i ) > γ. Then both the left-and right-hand sides are decreasing as x i decreases. However the single-crossing relation between ρ and u implies that the right-hand side is decreasing faster, so the inequality continues to hold for all x i < x i .
By Lemma 3, the FC constraint always binds, so the upper bound of support for t is equal to the lower bound of support for s. This implies that all individuals with x i > x F C t , either join s or take the radical outside option.
Finally, I must show that if some individual with ideology x i chooses the radical outside option, then all individuals with x i > x i also take the radical outside option. It must be that
Suppose x i > x s . Then the left-hand side is increasing in x i and the right-hand side is decreasing in x i so the inequality continues to hold for all x i > x i . Now suppose that x i < x s . Then, up to x s , both sides are increasing in x i , but the singlecrossing relationship between ρ and u implies that the left-hand side is increasing faster. And, for ideologies greater than x s the right-hand side is decreasing while the left-hand side is increasing.
So the inequality continues to hold for all x i > x i . 
Proof of Lemma 3
where the inequality follows from u > 0, ρ > 0, and the fact that, if ρ(·) bind on both sides, it must be that u (x T P s ) − ρ (x T P s ) > 0.
Case 2: ρ(x) binds on the right and γ binds on the left. 
In this case
Proof of Lemma 4
Differentiating the objective shows that the marginal benefit of extremism is f (x T P s (x s )) Turning to the second term. Clearly, f (x F C s ) > 0. Further, taking the cross partial:
, where the second line is rearrangement and the third line follows from the fact Hence, the entire cross-partial is positive, so Theorem 3 of Edlin and Shannon (1998) implies that x * s is strictly increasing in x t at an interior solution. There could be a corner solution atx s . Clearly,x s is increasing in x t . Thus, as x t increases, either there is still a corner solution and it has increased, or there is no longer a corner solution, but the new solution is higher than the originalx s .
There could also be a corner solution at x * t + . In this event, as x * t increases, the corner increases, forcing a higher x * s .
Proof of Proposition 1
The Envelope Theorem implies that the derivative of equation (3) 
Proof of Proposition 3
The proposition follows from the argument in the text and Lemmata 1, 4, and 6.
Proof of Proposition 4
Taking the cross-partial of the objective with respect to x t and γ yields:
∂ 2 x T P t ∂x t ∂γ .
Recall that x T P t is implicitly defined by β t − u(x t − x T P t ) − γ = 0. Implicitly differentiating shows that > 0. Thus, the first term is positive (since f < 0) and the second term is 0. This implies that the entire cross-partial is positive and Theorem 3 of Edlin and Shannon (1998) implies that at an interior solution x * t is strictly increasing in γ. The other two claims now follow directly from Proposition 1 and Remark 1.
